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G o d   i n   P o s t m o d e r n i t y1
 
 
 
 
The aim of this article is to suggest that the notoriously vague terms 
‘postmodernism’ and ‘postmodernity’ can in fact plausibly be construed as 
referring to one aspect of the secularisation of Christian theological ideas, 
including of course the idea of God, that has been in progress since the 
Enlightenment, if not before. This interpretation, which some may judge 
tendentious, is advanced briefly towards the end of the article, but an attempt is 
first made to situate postmodernism historically in the contemporary world. 
 
 
Introduction: modernity and modernism 
 
 
In trying to understand the term ‘postmodernism’, it may be useful to take it in 
conjunction with ‘postmodernity’, a closely related but distinct concept. The two 
terms ‘postmodernism’ and ‘postmodernity’ must in turn be seen in relation to 
the correlative or parallel expressions, ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’. For it is 
against modernism and modernity that postmodernism and postmodernity 
appear to define themselves. And indeed that fact alone – if it is a fact – should 
alert us to the possibility that when cultural theorists describe modernism and 
modernity, it may not be, so to speak, an innocent description that is given, but a 
description covertly weighted against modernism and modernity and in favour 
of postmodernism and postmodernity. 
 Be that as it may, one should perhaps begin by attempting to describe 
what is meant by modernity and modernism. Putting it rather crudely, modernity 
may be seen as designating various social, political, scientific, economic and 
legal realities, i.e. concrete historical facts, whereas the term ‘modernism’ has an 
intellectual and cultural reference. The two are evidently closely interconnected. 
 
1 This article originated in a lecture given in the Faculty of Law, UCC, on 13 March 1996. It 
was subsequently published in a slightly revised form as Chapter 10 of M. Henry, On not 
understanding God (The Columba Press: Dublin, 1997). It is here reproduced, with a few 
minor changes and corrections, by kind permission of the publisher. 
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Modernity – in the sense of the ‘modern age’ – refers to the post-mediaeval 
world,2 to the period when in the West life began to be characterised by a 
gradually intensifying process of secularisation. Secularisation involved the 
organisation of the life of this world according to rational, ordered principles, 
and a relegation of religious matters increasingly to the sphere of individual 
choice and responsibility. 
 The factors contributing to the emergence of the recognisably modern 
world certainly include the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. The 
essence of that revolution was the dual conviction that ‘there are no privileged 
or a priori substantive truths’ and that ‘the laws to which this world is subject 
are symmetrical.’3 In the course of time this conviction produced what Max 
Weber was to call the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ For where everything had 
to happen according to laws that could not admit of exceptions, there could no 
longer be any possibility of special events, divine interventions or miracles. Any 
‘knowledge’ acquired by circumventing the scientific method was not real 
knowledge at all. In the wake of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution 
came the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution, and 
the spectacular growth of historical consciousness in the nineteenth century, 
followed by the emergence of a post-industrial, highly technological civilisation 
in the twentieth century. 
 This entire development is sometimes referred to as the ‘project of 
modernity’, i.e. the attempt to expand human power and mastery over the world 
in a rationally controlled fashion. In its own way, it was a quasi-religious, or at 
least a teleologically inspired, i.e. goal-directed, total vision of reality, for it 
sought through constant progress to bring about the perfection, or the 
maximisation, of human dominance over the environment. The project of 
modernity was thus, in theological parlance, a Pelagian project, aimed at self-
sufficiency, and at least implicitly repudiating the traditional Christian doctrine 
of ‘original sin’, according to which there is a humanly irremovable weakness in 
the human condition. This whole modern development clearly defined itself in 
opposition to the older experience of the West in the Middle Ages and 
Antiquity. The immediate predecessor of the modern age, namely the mediaeval 
period, was perceived as other-worldly, religion-dominated, feudal and 
communitarian; the modern age was this-worldly, rationalist, increasingly 
democratic, individualist, and profoundly marked by the growth of capitalism. 
 
2 When the mediaeval world ended is, of course, a much-disputed question, and depends on 
which country – or segment of a country – one is talking about. Voltaire is alleged to have 
said on one occasion that the ‘Middle Ages’ were a few hundred yards down the road from 
where he himself was staying. Luis Buñuel claimed that in his native village in Aragón, 
the Middle Ages ended in 1914 . . .  
3 E. Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London, 1992), pp. 80–81. 
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 Now, while modernity can be seen as covering quite a long period of 
time, from about the fifteenth century onwards, that period’s awareness of itself 
is a much later development. By that is meant simply that any wide use of 
‘modernity’ as a theoretical concept is not, as far as this writer can ascertain, to 
be found before the nineteenth century.4 The French poet Rimbaud’s use of the 
term (‘Il faut être absolument moderne’5) is an example of its recently acquired 
cultural significance. That is to say, it was only relatively late in the day that 
‘modern’ Westerners began to suspect that their own cultural reality was 
something very different from that of their ancient and mediaeval forbears, and 
appeared to involve a radical break with what their predecessors had believed to 
be eternally and universally true about the human condition. 
 Once this realisation began to sink in, it was reflected in the intellectual, 
literary and artistic life of the West: i.e. in the cultural movement known now as 
‘modernism’, which could be dated very roughly, following M. Bradbury and J. 
McFarlane,6 from 1890 to 1930. This ‘movement’ was a reaction against realist 
modes of representation in the arts and in literature, and up to the start of this 
century was communicated by tendencies like Symbolism, Impressionism and 
Decadence. From the early part of the twentieth century up to the First World 
War ‘modernism’ was expressed by Fauvism, Cubism, Post-Impressionism, 
Futurism, Imagism and Vorticism. Finally, during and following the First World 
War Expressionism, Dada, and Surrealism came to the fore. Modernism would 
thus include: atonalism in music, anti-representationalism in art (i.e. abstract 
art), free verse in poetry, fragmentation and ‘stream of consciousness’ in the 
novel, functionalism in architecture (Bauhaus) and the general move away from 
linear or representational forms and towards the use of new spatial 
configurations in the arts (e.g. in the technique known as ‘collage’). 
 Modernism should however be seen in more than purely formal or artistic 
terms. That is to say, it was about more than a search for new forms in the arts 
and in literature, for it was, more profoundly, an often frenetic reaction to the 
political, social, military and ideological upheavals of the times. It represented, 
among other things, a sustained attempt at giving a radically new interpretation 
of space and time as the coordinates, if that is the right word, by which to plot 
 
4 The actual terms ‘modernus’ and ‘modernitas’ (in opposition to ‘antiquus’ and 
‘antiquitas’) can be found in Latin as far back as the fifth and twelfth centuries 
respectively (cf. Niklaus Peter, Im Schatten der Modernität – Franz Overbecks Weg zur 
„Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie“, Stuttgart and Weimar, 1992, p. 6); according 
to others (e.g. Jencks), the term goes back even further, to the third century. ‘Modern’ was 
used to refer to recent, as opposed to older, phenomena. But the connotation of the 
present’s radical difference from the past, and a sense even of its superiority with regard to 
the past, only began to attach to the term ‘modern’ from the Enlightenment onwards. 
5 At the end of Une Saison en Enfer. 
6 Authors of the volume Modernism in the Pelican Guides to European Literature. 
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the movement of human life.7 This fact is probably not unconnected with 
contemporary developments in the sciences, especially in physics, which 
overturned the Newtonian picture of reality, and more disturbingly overturned 
long-held assumptions about the relative solidity and stability of the material 
world.8
 Modernity indeed, in its late phase, witnessed such a violent overthrow of 
traditional patterns of interpreting and trying to manage the human condition, 
that for some theorists (cf. the phrase used by Marx and Engels in The 
Communist Manifesto: ‘all that is solid melts into air’9) it already contained 
implicitly within itself the flux and uncertainty associated with the postmodern 
mood.10
 To summarise this first part of the discussion: one could say that when the 
modern age achieved self-consciousness as the ‘modern age’, ‘modernity’ was 
born, and that in turn provoked the cultural response known as ‘modernism’. 
Then, when a self-conscious modernity became self-critical and self-doubting, 
postmodernity and its corresponding cultural and intellectual expression, 
postmodernism, appeared. It should, however, be pointed out that there are 
disputes about whether postmodernism can be properly described as the culture 
of postmodernity. 
 
 
Postmodernity: Hegel, Benjamin and Wittgenstein 
 
 
I now propose to take up three quotations, which cast significant light, in my 
judgement, on what has been said so far, and which can also serve to set the 
scene for what has still to be said about postmodernity and postmodernism 
proper. The first is from the ‘Preface’ to Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline (first published 1821). 
This work was Hegel’s attempt to set out his philosophy of law and his 
understanding of the modern state within the framework of his overall 
 
7 For the above information on modernism in the arts and literature I am indebted to the 
entry ‘modernism’ in The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. A. Bullock and O. 
Stallybrass (London, 1977), pp. 395f. 
8 Cf. William McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago, 1963), p. 753: ‘By 1917, leading 
painters had rejected the perspective frame within which European artistic vision had 
operated since the fifteenth century. Physicists had modified the Newtonian laws of 
motion within which European scientific thought had moved since the seventeenth 
century.’ 
9 An allusion to Prospero’s words from The Tempest, Act 4. Sc.1, l.150, quoted by David 
Lyon, Postmodernity (Buckingham, 1995), p. 8. 
10 Cf. the article ‘modernity’ in Collins Dictionary of Sociology, ed. D. Jary and J. Jary 
(Glasgow, 1995), p. 421. 
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philosophy of history. Towards the end of the ‘Preface’ there is a famous 
passage that reads: 
 
A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the world ought to be: 
philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function. As the thought 
of the world, it appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative 
process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily also 
apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that 
the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has 
grasped in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints 
its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only 
recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight 
only with the onset of dusk.11
 
The final sentence of this passage has been interpreted as meaning that ‘a 
culture’s philosophical understanding [i.e. its self-understanding] reaches its 
peak only when the culture enters its decline.’12 Or, to put the matter in a 
slightly different way, once a historical era has been understood, it has ceased to 
be truly alive, and a new era has begun.13 This, it seems to me, is what the term 
‘postmodern’ is trying to articulate with respect to the period in which we are 
now living. For what is perceived as dead or dying is modernity itself, and until 
a new understanding emerges of where or what we are now, cultural 
commentators have to make do with describing the present time as the age of 
postmodernity. 
 Some indeed would eschew even a term like ‘age’ or ‘period’ as being too 
redolent of an assumption of linear, progressive development within history. For 
such assumptions are, from a postmodernist perspective, incompatible with the 
 
11 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A.W. Wood, tr. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 
1991), p. 23. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel had used similar 
terminology: ‘Philosophy begins with the decline of a real world; when it appears . . . , 
painting its grey in grey, the freshness of that world’s youth and vitality has already 
disappeared . . . ’ (quoted in: K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch 
im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts, Hamburg, 1978, p. 53). One recalls Mephistopheles’ 
words in Goethe’s Faust Pt. 1 (‘Study’): ‘All theory, dear friend, is grey, but the golden 
tree of actual life springs ever green’ (as translated in The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations, 3rd ed., 1986, p. 230). Sensitivity to the difference between ‘life’ and 
‘thought’ is a commonplace in writers influenced by Romanticism — which, of course, is 
not to say that this difference does not contain a grain of abiding truth. 
12 Op. cit., p. 392 (comment of A.W. Wood’s). 
13 One may note in passing that this understanding of the past seems to have found favour 
with at least some twentieth-century historians. According to the late F.S.L. Lyons: ‘To 
understand the past fully is to cease to live in it, and to cease to live in it is to take the 
earliest steps to shape what is to come from the material of the present’ (quoted in: R. Kee, 
Ireland: A History, London, 1980, p. 7). 
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perceived demise of all ‘metanarratives’, about which more will be said later. 
However, if Hegel is correct, presumably the real understanding of our own age 
– the age of the postmodern, if we agree to call it that – will only emerge when 
our age itself will have ceased to live. Until then it cannot, in Hegelian terms, be 
understood. That, in turn, would seem to imply that so long as you are not sure 
about what contemporary experience means, you are at least still alive, which is 
some consolation perhaps. 
 The second quotation comes from Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), who 
was both a philosopher and, in his own way,14 a major literary critic. Benjamin’s 
rather apocalyptic vision of history, in which he had a keen eye for, as he put it, 
‘“the image of history . . . in its rejects’”, i.e. the casualties or ‘victims of 
progress’ (Merquior), is evident in the following passage from his Theses on the 
Philosophy of History §IX, a work completed in 1940, though not published 
until 1950: 
 
A Klee15 painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is 
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, 
his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. 
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of 
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly 
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before 
him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.16
 
Benjamin’s prophetic and pessimistic view of history can reasonably be 
interpreted as a symptom of the collapse of faith in modernity’s ideal of progress 
through the sustained application of Enlightenment rationalist principles to the 
organisation of human life. The optimism of the Enlightenment had already 
received a body-blow from the carnage of the First World War. The rise of 
fascism in the turmoil of the interwar period, followed by the destruction of 
European Jewry, the invention and utilisation of nuclear bombs, and all the other 
 
14 This reservation is perhaps necessary, if one accepts Marcel Reich-Ranicki’s (Die Anwälte 
der Literatur, Munich, 1996, pp. 227–236) persuasively argued assessment of Benjamin’s 
interest in literature as being less that of a pure critic than that of a thinker seeking what 
one might term a ‘literary correlative’ to his own personal crisis: ‘For Benjamin’s attitude 
to literature was dominated by his extreme self-absorption’ (p. 235). 
15 Swiss-born modernist painter (1879–1940). See article on Benjamin by J.G. Merquior in 
J. Wintle (ed.), Dictionary of Modern Culture (London, 1984), p. 30, for references in 
previous paragraph. 
16 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, Edited and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt, tr. 
Harry Zohn (London, 1982), pp. 259f. 
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catastrophes of the Second World War, together with a growing historical 
awareness of past, quite elaborate Western crimes (such as, for example, the 
post-mediaeval slave-trade): all of this helped to spread an attitude of scepticism 
towards the great project of modernity. More recently the breaching of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, marking the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern 
Europe, appeared to underline irrefutably yet another failure – after precisely 
two centuries – of the grand experiment, launched in 1789, to create a rationally 
based political system, initially for Europe, but aimed at encompassing the 
whole world in due time. 
 The belief in rationality as a universal feature of human nature, and in the 
ability of rational thought to control social, political, and economic life has thus 
suffered serious set-backs in this century. Even the belief in a relatively stable 
human self, often referred to as the ‘autonomous self’ of the Enlightenment, has 
met with increasing scepticism. ‘Our ready-made individuality, our identity,’ 
wrote D.H. Lawrence, ‘is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of 
time.’17 Since the end of the Second World War, apprehension and uncertainty 
about where poverty, ecological imbalance, and political instability on the one 
hand, and humanity’s highly developed technological power, on the other hand, 
— anxiety about where this is all leading, only serves to underscore still further 
the illusory quality of the Enlightenment’s dream of controlled progress. The 
‘key psychological mood of postmodern culture’ has been characterised as one 
of ‘panic’ (Arthur Kroker, in Baudrillard’s wake18). Such radical 
disenchantment ushers in the end of modernity — and the beginning of what? 
We shall look presently at what followed the collapse of confidence in the 
project of modernity. 
 But before that, the third quotation must be mentioned. This is a brief 
passage (written in 1930) from Wittgenstein’s posthumously published book, 
Culture and Value, where he remarks: 
 
I once said, perhaps rightly: The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and 
finally a heap of ashes, but spirits will hover over the ashes.19
 
Wittgenstein conveys memorably in these few words his sense of living in a 
period of fragmentation, dissolution, and decline. He shared the cultural 
pessimism of Oswald Spengler (The Decline of the West) that the world in 
which he had grown up was doomed, and so he, too, like Benjamin, can be seen 
as a kind of prophet of postmodernity – a term he would no doubt have recoiled 
 
17 See C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 1992), 
p. 463, citing Quiñones, Mapping Literary Modernism, p. 93. 
18 D. Lyon, op. cit., p. 16. 
19 L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, 
tr. P. Winch (Oxford, 1980), p. 3e. 
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from, but perhaps valid to the extent that Wittgenstein among others marks the 
end of an era, which we may call the era of modernity, and communicates, in 
such remarks as those just quoted, the sense of a civilisation in crisis. All that 
the West had built up over long centuries – on the three pillars of Judaeo-
Christian religion, Greek philosophy and Roman organisational, political and 
legal know-how – that enormous cultural edifice seemed to be disintegrating.20
 
 
Postmodern: a working definition 
 
 
As for the term ‘postmodern’ itself, its first use goes back, according to Charles 
Jencks,21 a writer on postmodern architecture and art, to the 1870s, when it was 
used by the British artist John Watkins Chapman. The popularity of the prefix 
‘post-’ dates also from the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Post-impressionism’ 
can be found in the 1880s, and ‘post-industrial’ in the period during and 
immediately following the First World War. By the 1960s the prefix had 
become attached to studies of literature, social thought and even religion (post-
Christian). According to Jencks, the notion of posteriority (‘the negative feeling 
of coming after a creative age or, conversely, the positive feeling of 
transcending a negative ideology’) became much more prevalent in the 1970s, in 
architecture and literature. 
 In architecture the term stands for a rejection of architectural modernism, 
i.e. the tradition represented by, say, Walter Gropius (Bauhaus) or Le Corbusier 
(‘A house is a living-machine’). In postmodern architecture the modernist 
principles of abstraction, simplicity, geometric purity and functionality are 
discarded in favour of a ‘renewed interest in buildings as signs and signifiers 
and in their referential potential and resources.’22 ‘Deconstructive 
 
20 It should be added, however, that Wittgenstein did not equate what he felt was a cultural 
decline with a decline in the value of human existence as such. In the same year (1930) in 
which the previous short passage was written he also wrote that, although modern 
civilization in its ‘industry, architecture and music’ and ‘in its fascism and socialism’ was 
‘alien and uncongenial’ to him, this was ‘not a value judgement’. For what he took to be 
‘the disappearance of the arts’ did not ‘justify judging disparagingly the human beings 
who make up this civilization.’ He added ‘that the disappearance of a culture does not 
signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this 
value’ (Culture and Value, p. 6e). 
21 In a letter to the TLS reprinted in R. Appignanesi and C. Garratt, Postmodernism for 
Beginners (Cambridge, 1995), p. 3. 
22 Art. ‘postmodern’ in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p. 635. Cf. Robert B. 
Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Oxford 1991), p. 199, n.21: ‘The general 
relation between assumptions inherent in architecture of all historical epochs and broad 
philosophical issues is not limited to the modernism/postmodernism controversy. The 
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postmodernism’ became an influential movement when the French post-
structuralists (Lyotard, Derrida and Baudrillard) were accepted in the United 
States in the late 1970s. Jencks plausibly suggests that the attraction of the term 
‘postmodern’ lies in the way it captures the thought that we have outgrown 
modernity and modernism, but without knowing really where we are heading. 
 The term ‘postmodern’ attempts, thus, to hold together a number of 
different ideas and attitudes. Intellectually, postmodernist thought represents a 
reaction to many aspects of modern philosophy and to the assumptions 
underlying that philosophy. It is a movement that, rather than outlining or 
adhering to a particular set of beliefs on specific philosophical issues, radically 
calls into question the fundamental presuppositions of modern philosophy itself. 
(One should perhaps note that in attempting to see more precisely what 
‘postmodernism’ ‘means’ within contemporary thought, one is adopting, strictly 
speaking, a non-postmodern perspective, for one of the salient features of 
philosophical postmodernism is that there is no such thing as a fixed meaning to 
anything, be it world, word, text, or individual human subject.) Yet as a reactive 
movement, postmodernism is – somewhat ironically – also deeply traditional, in 
that it re-enacts one of the most deep-seated tendencies in Western thought. One 
has only to think of the Reformation or the French Revolution, to say nothing of 
other upheavals, to see how ingrained the inclination actually is in Western 
history to call received wisdom into question, and to strike out in new 
directions. 
 There will certainly be disagreement on what precisely are the 
fundamental assumptions of modern (i.e. post-mediaeval) philosophy, which 
postmodernism calls into question, but the main targets of postmodern thought 
would appear to include two central issues that can be dealt with quite briefly. 
These are, firstly, the notion of an autonomous, clearly defined self, and, 
secondly, foundationalism. 
 To begin with the fate of the human self in postmodernism, here there is a 
noticeable difference from modernism. A modernist poet, like Yeats, could take 
the experience of dislocation (cf. ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold’) as a 
spur to create his own ‘“subjective center”’, as ‘an autonomous self-defining 
artist’,23 but ‘for postmodernism there is no center at all, the subject itself is “de-
centered”, no longer an origin or source, but itself a result, a product of multiple 
social and psychological forces . . .’24
 What is this ‘decentred self’ which crops up frequently in discussions of 
postmodernism? The expression refers to ‘a conception of the self, or the 
 
relation between the idea of self-sufficiency and architecture goes back at least to the 
Tower of Babel story.’ The symbol of the Tower of Babel has indeed, fittingly, come to 
signify – again – the confusions of the contemporary scene. 
23 Pippin, op. cit., p. 156. 
24 Ibid., pp. 156f. 
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thinking and acting subject, in which the self is no longer regarded as providing 
the kind of ultimate grounding for epistemological thinking that is often 
assumed in traditional forms of philosophy . . .’25 Three different sources seem 
to have contributed to the emergence of this view: (a) from psychoanalysis has 
come the idea that the ‘ego’ is not in charge of the individual’s life, but is in 
various, ultimately unaccountable ways affected by the unconscious; (b) from 
the influence of Saussurean linguistics has come the notion that, just as in 
language each element or sign only makes sense in relation to, and differentiated 
from, the other elements or signs in the overall system, so the self (‘I’) does not 
make sense in isolation, but only in relation to, and differentiated from, such 
terms as ‘you’, ‘she’, they’, ‘we’, etc.; hence the ‘self’ does not enjoy any real 
autonomy or discrete identity;26 and finally (c) a belief that autonomy belongs, if 
anywhere, to culture as such, or, in the case of a writer, to the text, from which 
the notion of an author has been banished, has also played a significant role in 
this process. In structuralism meaning was at least preserved in a total system of 
which the self was one element, even if the self was decentred and thus no 
longer centre-stage. But in post-structuralist thought, which feeds into 
postmodernism, neither the self nor the system in which the self is embedded is 
seen as providing a secure foundation for any final meaning or truth about the 
human condition. 
 This brings us to the second target of the postmodernist critique of 
Western thought mentioned above: foundationalism. Postmodernism is 
associated with the alleged end of foundationalism, foundationalism being the 
view that for such intellectual activities as science or philosophy solid bases do 
exist, in empirically observable facts, for instance, or self-evident ideas or a 
priori truths. Foundationalism is thus an epistemological position that attempts 
to justify our beliefs by giving or finding foundations for them that cannot be 
doubted.27
 As a prime example of a foundationalist thinker Descartes, for one, finds 
no favour with the postmodernists. For Descartes moved from what he himself 
was convinced was indubitable first-person knowledge to knowledge of the 
objective (external) world, a move relying on first-person knowledge 
(knowledge of the self) as the foundation of all other knowledge. But, barely a 
century after Descartes, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume is 
sceptical of such Cartesian moves and, curiously enough, already very close to a 
postmodern position (if position is not too definite a term). Roger Scruton 
remarks that ‘Hume was inclined to say that the self is a kind of illusion, as are 
 
25 Article ‘decentred self or decentred subject’ in Collins Dictionary of Sociology, p. 147, on 
which the rest of the above paragraph is based. 
26 Cf. at the start of Samuel Beckett’s novel, The Unnamable: ‘I, say I. Unbelieving.’ (See 
William Barrett, Death of the Soul, Oxford, 1987, p. 46.) 
27 Cf. R. Scruton, Modern Philosophy (London, 1994), p. 47. 
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all the conundrums which derive from it.’28 Hume himself confessed, perhaps 
ironically, that ‘whenever I look inside myself, there is no self to be found.’29 
Elsewhere he describes the self as ‘only a heap of perceptions’.30 Indeed the line 
that goes from Hume via Bertrand Russell to the modern American philosopher 
Quine ends up at the same point as the conclusions of the post-structuralists, 
Foucault and Derrida. That is to say, ‘the notion of the self’ is eliminated ‘as the 
source of consciousness, the arbiter of meaning, the unifying thing that thinks. 
Foucault’s remark that “It is not man who takes the place of God, but 
anonymous thinking, thinking without a subject” sounds like an unconscious 
echo of Russell’s statement in The Analysis of Mind that instead of saying “I 
think” “It would be better to say ‘it thinks in me’ or better still . . . ‘there is a 
thought in me’.”’31
 Now if, as one spokesman for postmodernism, the American philosopher 
Richard Rorty urges, we set aside the foundationalist assumptions shared by the 
major philosophers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, we 
are left free-floating, as it were, with no basis on which to establish hierarchies 
of intellectual or moral or aesthetic value or truth that would be universally 
binding. This is one of the consequences to flow from the nihilism diagnosed so 
ruthlessly in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche, and enacted, according to 
some observers, in the twentieth. 
 The forsaking of universal values and canons of taste combines naturally 
enough, however, with a renewal of interest in local and minority concerns, 
which many would regard as a plus for postmodernism. This may help to 
explain, or alternatively it may be a reflection of, the increased social and 
political weight now attaching to ‘minority’ issues in such areas as race 
(ethnicity), religion, sex, culture and language.32 (A similar concern for minority 
interests can be observed in the period of Romanticism, which in its day rejected 
the universalising claims or pretensions of the Enlightenment.33) 
 
28 Op. cit., p. 43. 
29 Cited in R.C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750 (Oxford, 1988), p. 1. 
30 W. Barrett, Death of the Soul, p. 46. 
31 Brenda Almond, Philosophy (Harmondsworth, 1988), p. 130; the reference to Foucault is 
to M. Foucault, The Order of Things and the reference to Russell is to B. Russell, The 
Analysis of Mind, p. 18. 
32 Cf. Pippin, op. cit., p. 157. 
33 Romanticism revolted against the notion that reality has an objective, unchanging structure 
existing independently of human beings. For the Romantics truth is not discovered, but 
created by us. They repudiated the idea of a priori (pre-existent), universally valid truths 
that only needed to be discovered, and substituted instead the ideal of creating truth as an 
artist might create a work of art. A corollary of this attitude is a new respect for minorities, 
whose authentically expressed ‘truth’ may run contrary to traditional, accepted, 
‘objective’, conventional wisdom. [On this question see I. Berlin, ‘Preface’ to H.G. 
Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics (Oxford, 1966).] The attitude of the 
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 The ‘flux and fragmentation’ that postmodernism celebrates is notoriously 
difficult to pin down, as may be becoming clear, so perhaps one way of trying to 
find our way tentatively, if not through, then at least into the ever-changing 
world of postmodernism, might be to deal with some of the theorists whose 
names have become almost synonymous with the movement, rather ironically 
some might think, in view of what postmodernism is supposed to believe about 
the death of the old (Cartesian) self. In what follows it is important to bear in 
mind, however, that not all those mentioned would accept the label 
‘postmodern’. 
 
 
Jean François Lyotard 
 
 
We may begin with Lyotard (b. 1924) since he has been credited with having 
popularised the term ‘postmodern’ through his book The Postmodern 
Condition.34 ‘Simplifying to the extreme,’ he says, ‘I define postmodern as 
incredulity towards metanarratives.’ According to one writer ‘[t]he main 
“metanarrative” in question follows the Enlightenment line that science 
legitimates itself as the bearer of emancipation.’35 However all the grand 
narratives or metanarratives (such as the Myth of Progress, Marxism [an 
important case for Lyotard, who had been a Marxist himself], Emancipation 
through science, and, of course, older metanarratives like the Judaeo-Christian 
narrative of ‘God, Creation, Fall, Redemption and Eschatological Fulfilment’), 
all of these metanarratives have, according to Lyotard, collapsed. Borrowing an 
idea from Wittgenstein, Lyotard regards even modern science as now at best to 
be accepted as one particular language-game, i.e. bereft of any universalist 
pretensions. 
 In speaking of the end of metanarratives Lyotard and other theorists of 
postmodernism are giving voice to a widely perceived lack of any overall vision 
of reality in the contemporary world. That is to say, no one, according to 
Lyotard’s diagnosis, can any longer see the wood for the trees, for the very 
simple reason that there is no ‘wood’ to see, just as there is no ‘God’, hence no 
‘God’s eye’ (over)view of things . . . 
 Thus for Lyotard the idea that any state of affairs, or view of reality, can 
be legitimated through a metanarrative has foundered in the postmodern world. 
 
Romantics is exacerbated in postmodernism, which can thus perhaps be interpreted as an 
extreme form of neo-Romanticism, but with this important difference: that faith in the 
autonomy and coherence of the self, which the Romantics retained, has (officially, at any 
rate) disappeared with the postmodernists. 
34 French edition 1979, ET 1984. 
35 D. Lyon, op. cit., p. 12. 
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Fragmentation and the atomisation of social life are the result. It should be noted 
however that Lyotard’s announcement of ‘the end of politics’ has led some (e.g. 
Jürgen Habermas) to accuse him of neo-conservatism, since he lacks ‘all 
theoretical justification of an alternative to the social status quo in advanced 
capitalism.’36 Habermas’ own refusal to abandon, as Lyotard appears to do, the 
moral imperative of seeking a rationale for any political course of action, is, one 
may suggest, surely preferable to the alternative of dismissing as an 
Enlightenment prejudice the need to work out a theoretical legitimation for 
one’s actions. The fact that, as Lenin was fond of pointing out, one is often 
faced with the need to act in the absence of a completely satisfactory theoretical 
justification for one’s course of action, hardly makes the search for such 
justification – even if it cannot ever be definitively found within history – 
redundant, or humanly irrelevant. 
 
 
Jean Baudrillard 
 
 
Another influential theorist of the postmodern condition is the French 
sociologist, Jean Baudrillard (b. 1929) who is associated above all with the idea 
that, through the modern electronic mass media of communication, the 
consumer society is being transformed into a kind of madhouse of ever-
proliferating signs which end up by blurring or effacing the distinction between 
image and reality. Baudrillard caused a bit of a stir by declaring that the Gulf 
War did not happen, which obviously was something of an exaggeration, but it 
drew attention to the way the material and human substance of life is in danger 
of being transmuted into electronically reproduced images (simulacra), thereby 
losing its specificity and its depth.37 It is this simulated, humanly empty, world 
that Baudrillard seems to have in mind by his use of a term like ‘hyperreality’. 
Hyperreality is a condition ‘in which the alleged “real” is no more real than the 
thing which feigns [or simulates] it.’38 The overall effect of postmodernity for 
Baudrillard is thus to produce a ‘loss of stable meaning’.39 Clearly Baudrillard 
 
36 J.G. Merquior, Foucault (London, 1985), p. 148; see also Collins Dictionary of Sociology, 
p. 378. 
37 These complaints may, arguably, have been anticipated in general terms by Feuerbach 
when he wrote (in 1843): ‘ . . . [T]he present age . . . prefers the sign to the thing signified, 
the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence . . .’ (‘Preface’ to 
The Essence of Christianity, tr. George Eliot, New York, 1957, p. xxxix; cf. G. Debord, La 
Société du Spectacle, Paris, 1992, p. 13). 
38 Collins Dictionary of Sociology, p. 301. 
39 Quoted ibid., p. 39. 
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has raised Marx’s sense of ‘everything solid melting into air’ to an almost 
apocalyptic level. 
 
 
Michel Foucault 
 
 
We come, lastly, to two other important theorists of the postmodern situation, 
both also French like Lyotard and Baudrillard, but whose influence outside 
France has perhaps been more pervasive than theirs: Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida. 
 Firstly, Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Foucault was a French philosopher 
and historian who worked mainly in Paris, the home of ‘radical rhetoric’40 for 
the French intelligentsia. Foucault has been an important voice in the twentieth-
century French philosophical debate on reason, language, knowledge and power. 
He has become well-known for his historical studies of madness, imprisonment, 
medicine and sexuality, which are not carried through in the tradition of studies 
in the ‘history of ideas’, but seek rather to uncover the linkages between 
knowledge and power within various societies and institutions. In this 
endeavour Foucault acknowledges his indebtedness to Nietzsche who, in his 
own works, had traced connections between the human will to power and belief 
systems (notably Christianity), suspecting the latter of being merely 
rationalisations of the former. 
 The drawback with such a radically sceptical approach to knowledge as 
Foucault espouses is that if all ‘discourse’ is assumed to be a more or less 
sophisticated justification of a set of power-structures, what exempts the critic’s 
own ‘discourse’ from a similarly radical scepticism? The rather pessimistic 
conclusion that all discourse only has the ‘authority’ of the epoch it reflects to 
support it, is only true, paradoxically, if it is false.41 Nietzsche, in fairness, was 
at least more worried about this problem than Foucault, who seemed content to 
deny any abiding value to his own critique of what were, from his perspective, 
false ‘discursive practices’, exerting power over human bodies at different times 
and places. 
 Foucault is unlike Nietzsche too in his revolt against Enlightenment 
rationalism, and in the absence from his work of anything resembling 
Nietzsche’s ‘dionysian’ affirmation of ‘life’, for all his (Nietzsche’s) critique of 
décadence. Foucault, as the – or at least one – enfant terrible of late twentieth-
century French philosophy, combines what appears to be a slightly self-
indulgent intellectual anarchism with an extremely bleak view of human 
 
40 J.G. Merquior, Foucault, p. 159. 
41 Cf. R. Scruton, Modern Philosophy, p. 6. 
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prospects. He once spoke of his ‘hyperactive pessimism’. In Foucault, 
postmodernity looks like the second, definitive, ‘Fall of Man’, from which there 
can be no redemption, unless perhaps one were to see a glimmer of hope in his 
assertion of a moral value in philosophy’s readiness to ‘think the unthought’, 
which is also, he claims, a willingness ‘to “refuse what we are’”.42
 
 
Jacques Derrida 
 
 
The final postmodernist key-figure I shall discuss is Jacques Derrida, born in 
Algeria in 1930, but now resident in France. He is perhaps best known for his 
radical mode of thought, known as ‘deconstruction.’ 
 Derrida has argued that philosophers have simply been on the wrong tack 
in looking for underlying ‘essences’ or ‘first principles’ in reality. He himself, 
drawing on the Swiss linguist Saussure and the German philosopher Heidegger, 
holds that language, as a system that functions because of the differences 
inherent in it, cannot be, as traditionally conceived, the unambiguous bearer of 
truth. Even structuralists like the social anthropologist Lévi-Strauss had still 
held to this latter, for Derrida untenable, position. Derrida regards the sign 
(signifier) – which is in any case arbitrary both as an acoustic (spoken) and a 
visible (written) image – as having no stable semantic relation to that which is 
signified. For a linguistic sign gains its signification from the fact that it is 
differentiated from other signs within a system (e.g., fat, cat, mat, bat, sat, etc.). 
Hence its meaning depends on its relation to other (absent) signs and must 
consequently always be deferred (postponed). Derrida plays on the two 
meanings of the French verb ‘différer’ (meaning ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’ or ‘ to 
postpone’) to make his point, coining the neologism ‘différance’ to drive it 
home. What is true at the relatively humble level of phonetics Derrida takes to 
be transferable or applicable to the altogether higher and more complex level of 
meaning itself. 
 Strictly speaking, the ‘absent’ signs on which the meaning of any specific 
sign depends are not actually absent, but, in Derrida’s terminology, ‘self-
effacing’. Thus, as one commentator has put it: 
 
[I]n any spoken or written utterance, the seeming signification is the result only of a 
‘self-effacing’ trace — self-effacing because one is not aware of it — which consists 
of all the nonpresent meanings whose differences from the present instance are the 
sole factor which invests the utterance with its ‘effect’ of having a meaning in itself. 
The consequence, according to Derrida, is that we can never have a determinate, or 
 
42 Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, ed. by J.O. Urmson and J. Rée 
(London, 1991), p. 112. 
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decidable, present meaning; he asserts, however, that the differential play of language 
does produce illusory ‘effects’ of determinable meanings. 
. . . [T]here is indeed an ‘effect’ of meaning in an utterance which is produced by its 
difference from other meanings, but . . . on the other hand, since this meaning can 
never come to rest in an actual presence, or ‘transcendental signified,’ its determinate 
specification is deferred from one substitutive linguistic interpretation to another, in a 
movement, or ‘play,’ without end. The meaning of any spoken or written utterance, as 
Derrida puts it in another of his coinages, is disseminated—a term which includes, 
among its deliberately contradictory significations, that of having an effect of meaning 
(a ‘semantic’ effect), of dispersing meanings among innumerable alternatives, and of 
negating any specific meaning. There is thus no ground, in the incessant play of 
différance that constitutes language, for attributing a decidable meaning, or even a 
finite set of determinately multiple meanings (which he calls ‘polysemism’), to any 
utterance that we speak or write. As Derrida puts it in Writing and Difference, p. 280: 
‘The absence of a transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely.’43
 
Moreover, just as meaning is not transparently and exhaustively present in any 
sign, neither can the author of a text any longer be thought of as ‘authoritatively’ 
present in that text. The author has no command of a text, and cannot impose 
meaning on it. As Derrida put it in an interview given a few years ago: the 
author is ‘not in the situation of the creator god before his text.’44 Texts, 
therefore, as linguistic artefacts do not belong to their authors, for a linguistic 
system precedes and eludes the full grasp of any author. 
 The technical Derridean term ‘dissemination’, mentioned in the above 
quotation, is relevant to this notion. For Derrida, ‘Dissemination is something 
which no longer belongs to the regime of meaning; it exceeds not only the 
multiplicity of meanings, but also meaning itself. I attempt to read the 
movement of this dissemination in the text, in writing; it can’t be dominated by 
either the semantic or the thematic field.’45 Dissemination seems, thus, to be a 
sort of irresistible ‘supra-semantic’ flux, the course of whose finally 
unspecifiable movement the critic attempts, always unsuccessfully, to chart. For 
the critic, like everyone and everything else, lives in an infinite multiplicity (‘the 
Many’), from which all possibility of ultimate, transcendent, unitary 
comprehension (‘the One’) has been banished. This flux is, however, irresistible 
in the sense that it is the element in which alone the critic can live, just as a fish 
can live only in its element of water. 
 In such circumstances texts themselves can at best only be provisionally 
interpreted in relation to other texts (this seems to be what is meant by 
intertextuality) and not in relation to any ‘truth’ outside the text (‘il n’y a pas de 
 
43 M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, (Orlando, 1988), pp. 204f. 
44 R. Mortley, French Philosophers in Conversation (London, 1991), p. 98. 
45 Ibid. 
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hors-texte’46), whether that ‘truth’ be the author’s mind, or some other 
‘objective’ standard existing allegedly in independence of the text. 
 It is also in this context that the notion of ‘logocentrism’ can be located. 
For Derrida logocentrism is ‘the belief that the Word of the transcendental 
signifier (e.g. God, the World Spirit) may provide a foundation for a whole 
system of thought.’47 It is ‘an attempt which can only ever fail, an attempt to 
trace the sense of being to the logos, to discourse or reason . . . and which 
considers writing or technique to be secondary to logos. The forms which this 
has taken in the west are of course influenced by Greek philosophy.’48 As this 
comment prepares us to see, the demise of logocentrism is closely connected in 
Derrida’s mind with the startling claim that the written word takes precedence 
over the spoken word. 
 The target at which this claim is aimed is the traditional privileging in the 
West of the ‘notion of speech as the voice or “presence” of consciousness’, 
which in Derrida’s terminology is labelled ‘phonocentrism’.49 In making his 
claim about the untenability of ‘phonocentrism’, Derrida is espousing or 
endorsing the idea ‘that it is with writing that language takes on the appearance 
of what Foucault called “autonomous discourse”, without an author, without 
intention or interpretation, and outside of space, time and context.’50 In 
affirming this Derrida is taking up a so-called anti-transcendental stance with 
regard to truth. ‘For Derrida, as for Lévi-Strauss and Foucault, there is no 
constitution of meaning by a transcendental subject, a point which he makes 
with characteristic hyperbole by insisting that “texts have no author”. 
Consequently texts do not and cannot express universal meanings, and the point 
of deconstruction is to do away with “the transcendental signified”. He too 
accepts the fact that one cannot escape from one’s historical and cultural 
context, but he turns this even against Foucault, who could not possibly 
understand the madness he describes in his work (Foucault, in return, dubbed 
Derrida “le petit pédagogue”).’51
 Derrida is thus systematically critical of all metaphysical thought, and one 
might say almost neurotically aware of how our language is shot through with 
philosophical assumptions which he claims must always be called into question. 
His thought contains a consistent critique of the main Western tradition in 
philosophy going back at least to Plato, whom Nietzsche referred to as ‘das 
grösste Malheur Europas!’ (Europe’s greatest calamity!)52 This tradition is, in 
 
46 From De la grammatologie, quoted in M.H. Abrams, op. cit., p. 203. 
47 Collins Dictionary of Sociology, p. 148. 
48 Mortley, op. cit., p. 104. 
49 Collins Dictionary of Sociology, p. 148. 
50 Solomon, op. cit., p. 201. 
51 Ibid. 
52 In a letter to Franz Overbeck (posted in Nice, 9 January 1887). 
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Derrida’s eyes, based on an erroneous desire for, and belief in, some 
fundamental certainty conveyed by, or rather betrayed in, such philosophical 
concepts as substance, essence, origin, identity, truth. In Twilight of the Idols 
Nietzsche had already written: ‘Today . . . we see ourselves as it were entangled 
in error, necessitated to error, to precisely the extent that our prejudice in favour 
of reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, 
materiality, being . . .’53 Derrida’s philosophical ‘strategy’ (as he prefers to call 
it, rather than ‘method’) of deconstruction is aimed at uncovering and laying 
bare such hidden philosophical assumptions in the texts of Western philosophy, 
even in thinkers like Nietzsche who was himself, of course, already 
pathologically suspicious of metaphysics. 
 Deconstruction is therefore a ‘project . . . to reveal the ambivalence of all 
texts, which can only be understood in relation to other texts . . . and not in 
relation to any “literal meaning” or normative truth.’54 Putting it slightly 
differently and more simply, deconstruction can also perhaps essentially be seen 
as a strategy for puncturing the illusions of philosophers whose claims for their 
own philosophy cannot be made good and are thus, for Derrida, pretentious. The 
heart of the supreme Western metaphysical claim is what Derrida calls 
‘(following Heidegger) . . . “the myth of presence”, whether this takes the form 
of the immanent presence of God, or of the world as a determinate entity, or of 
the self as an “inner” certainty.’55 This myth Derrida wishes to subvert. He 
knows, however, that ‘it is an illusion to suppose that one can escape altogether 
from the pervasive metaphysics of presence, since to put oneself “outside” 
metaphysics is an indirect way of affirming it,’ thus ‘he suggests that one has to 
think in terms which neither affirm nor oppose but resist metaphysical 
concepts.’56
 Derrida is reminiscent of Nietzsche in his realisation of how difficult it is 
to subvert a tradition while still operating within it, and having to work quite 
consciously and, as it were, parasitically with its assumptions (of truth, order, 
etc.). As Nietzsche said in a famous remark: ‘I fear we are not getting rid of God 
because we still believe in grammar . . . ’57 However in a wider or longer 
perspective Derrida’s thought, like Nietzsche’s, might perhaps be seen as being 
ultimately dependent upon a tradition of radical, and essentially religious, 
scepticism, a tradition which is aware of the difference, but simultaneously of 
the connection, between ‘truth’ and its verbalised, codified, fixed, written 
expression, or, in more conventional terms, between the ‘spirit’ and the ‘letter’, 
(as in the paradigmatic Western case of the difference, but also the connection, 
 
53 Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1990), p. 47. 
54 Collins Dictionary of Sociology, p. 148. 
55 Solomon, op. cit., p. 200. 
56 J. Wintle (ed.), Dictionary of Modern Culture, p. 91. 
57 Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, p. 48. 
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between God and Holy Writ, the textual trace – to use a Derridean term – of the 
deity). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
A salient feature of postmodernism is that it is a Western (and not, for instance, 
an Islamic) phenomenon, and can, perhaps, be interpreted as an extreme form of 
secularisation. The Enlightenment project, or the ‘project of modernity’, with its 
belief in Progress, is itself often regarded as a secularised form of the Christian 
notion of Providence.58 But how can postmodernism be seen as a secularized 
form of Western (and hence, Judaeo–Christian) thought? 
 One might first of all suggest that the postmodernist notion of the 
decentred self is a version of a very ancient religious notion, that places God and 
not the self, or even the whole created order, at the centre of reality. In 
postmodernism, admittedly, the self does not yield to God but to infinite 
multiplicity. One might therefore not wish to place too much weight on the 
possible religious genealogy of the decentred self in postmodernism. 
 However, one is on firmer ground, in my view, in seeing postmodernism 
as dialectically related to Christianity, if one bears in mind the traditional 
Christian doctrine of creation. According to this doctrine the world is God’s 
creation, and hence is not intrinsically divine. The world thus enjoys a certain 
relative autonomy or independence or ‘reality’, but it is an autonomy ultimately 
related to, or dependent upon, the deity. 
 If belief in God falls out of the picture, one is still left with a world, but it 
is now a world whose giver and guarantor of ‘reality’ no longer exists. Hence 
the world’s intrinsic value collapses into a void and one ends in nihilism, which 
in postmodernism translates into such concepts as: loss of the ‘transcendental 
signifier’, or absence of ‘a transcendental signified’ or of any determinate 
meaning. Similarly, human beings have been traditionally understood by our 
culture to be made in the image of God, but if there is no God, that image fades 
away, leaving behind an unidentified, and perhaps unidentifiable, ‘humanity’. 
 But the nihilism just mentioned is a nihilism which is still dialectically 
related to a now non-existent God. Is it, however, not strange that the world 
should in these circumstances be interpreted nihilistically, rather than as 
‘naturally’ meaningful and valuable by and in itself? It seems, therefore, 
plausible to suggest that the concept of nihilism – and thus of postmodernism – 
itself still moves within the shadow of theism, or within the orbit of religious 
 
58 For instance, by David Lyon, op. cit., p. 5. 
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discourse, that it is in fact, despite its name, an intrinsically, even if parasitically, 
Judaeo-Christian religious concept. 
 Related to this thesis is the further consideration that in Christianity the 
‘word’ or ‘logos’, as the expression of God, has, as the doctrine of the 
Incarnation reveals, never been exhaustively identified with pure thought or pure 
intellect, nor has the expression of the ‘logos’ in history been identified with a 
text (the Bible), as in, say, Islam. It is perhaps not too surprising then that, if 
written texts are – contrary to the deepest instincts of our civilisation, if one may 
so express it, – given priority (as in Derrida) over the unwritten ‘word’, no 
amount of intellectual probing of any text ever yields a satisfactory, final 
solution as to its ‘meaning’. This, a postmodernist might of course retort, is 
precisely how things are and should be: meaning is never fully accessible in this 
world, it is always deferred. . . But as against this objection, one could argue that 
the search for meaning or understanding (except in a purely functional or 
pragmatic sense) is rather futile and literally pointless, if there is, finally, no 
‘point’. And yet the undeniable attraction of trying to decipher the meaning of 
texts is emphasised by our seeming inability to resist it,59 as if, again somewhat 
instinctively, we assumed that there was a genuine connection (not, however, 
amounting to an identification) between linguistically expressed meaning, and 
the most abiding, ultimate explanation of reality that traditionally has been 
called ‘God’. 
 
 
59 Cf. Kant’s idea that although thought cannot grasp the a priori conditions of our existence, 
neither can it resist the desire to do so. See Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (London, 1991), 
pp. 23f. 
